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Explaining Scientific Progress: Lakatos’ Methodological Account 
of Kuhnian Patterns of Theory Change 
Martin Carrier (Bielefeld University) 
Theory choice decisions were the focus of the debate on theory change that dominated philosophy 
of science in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Comparative evaluations of competing theoretical approaches 
were supposed to form at the same time the nucleus of scientific progress and of scientific rational-
ity. A theory choice decision singles out the methodologically most qualified alternative from 
among a set of rival theories. A sequence of such decisions is supposed to generate a series of theo-
ries with increasing methodological virtue; and a series of this kind constitutes scientific progress. 
Moreover, scientific rationality is tied up with the nature and justification of the criteria brought to 
bear on theory choice decisions. Rational theory choices are made relying on objective and epis-
temically significant criteria. The intertwinement of rationality, theory change and theory choice is 
among the outstanding commitments underlying the entire debate on “theory dynamics”; in particu-
lar, it is constitutive of the methodological approaches of Larry Laudan and, above all, Imre Laka-
tos. The backdrop against which this debate unfolded is given by the methodological challenge in-
volved in Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science. My objective is to elucidate more clearly Lakatos’ 
attempt to neutralize methodological threats he assumed to be inherent in some of Kuhn’s claims on 
theory change. 
I begin by giving a brief sketch of Kuhn’s model of scientific change and pass on to highlight 
the limitations it entails for any account of theory choice decisions appealing exclusively to objec-
tive and epistemically significant methodological criteria. Subsequently, I outline Lakatos’ method-
ology and elaborate the criteria of theory choice involved in it. Finally, I develop the implications of 
Lakatos’ model for scientific change and address in particular its bearing on those features of scien-
tific change that Kuhn held to defy the grip of systematic methodology. It is well-known that Laka-
tos attempted to give a sort of rational reconstruction of some of Kuhn’s allegedly descriptive gen-
eralizations about scientific change. My aim is to spell out the nature and import of this endeavor. 
21. Some Basics of Kuhn’s “Paradigm Theory” 
Kuhn introduced a distinction between two levels of scientific theorizing that was retained in all 
later conceptions; the distinction, namely, between an overarching theoretical framework, on the 
one hand, and its more specific elaboration, on the other. This framework he called “paradigm”; it 
was supposed to embrace theoretical principles, methodological or metaphysical commitments, and 
a collection of exemplary solutions to problems (whence derives the appellation “paradigm”). For 
example, the paradigm of 19th-century wave optics proceeded from the assumption that light is to 
be conceived as a state of elastic oscillation of a pervasive medium. Specific versions of the para-
digm consisted in more elaborate explanations of optical phenomena such as refraction, diffraction 
or interference. A scientific discipline that is dominated by one particular paradigm has entered the 
stage of “normal science.” The shared commitment to an overarching framework relieves the scien-
tists from the need to defend their basic orientation and thus allows them to focus on more produc-
tive, technical work. In normal science a paradigm rules monopolistically and unquestioned. Its 
principles are not liable to empirical test. If an application of a paradigm fails unexpectedly, i.e., if 
an anomaly emerges, the blame is not attributed to the paradigmatic principles themselves. Rather, 
additional unrecognized influences or lack of ingenuity on the part of the scientists are held respon-
sible. That is, either is the situation considered more complex than anticipated or the scientists’ 
creativity and technical skill are found wanting. The paradigm is maintained in spite of empirical 
counterinstances. In sum, Kuhnian normal science is characterized by paradigm monopoly and 
paradigm immunity (Kuhn (1970a), 77-80; Kuhn (1970b), 6). 
It is obvious that the central traits of Kuhn’s normal science stand in marked contrast to 
Popper’s methodological advice to heed counterinstances. Scientists informed by Popper’s falsifica-
tionism must not ignore empirical problems. Rather, they are called upon to either modify the the-
ory in a methodologically acceptable fashion or to drop it entirely. A theory is improved in an ac-
ceptable way if the anomaly is resolved and at the same time the theory’s empirical content (i.e., the 
number of possible observations conflicting with the theory) is expanded (Popper (1935), §§ 20, 
31). Nothing of the kind is required from Kuhnian normal scientists. They are licensed to shelve 
unsolved problems and to go ahead undauntedly. The difference between Popper and Kuhn cannot 
be traced back to the ubiquitous contrast between lofty normative principles and a sloppy practice. 
Namely, Kuhn gives epistemological reasons for the nonchalant attitude toward anomalies he as-
sumes to be characteristic of normal science. The chief reason is based on the historical observation 
that no theory ever gets rid of anomalies. This Kuhnian tenet of the “omnipresence of anomalies” 
rules out assessing each of them as a serious threat to the theory. Taking in the Popperian spirit 
3each anomaly as a potential refutation amounts to closing down the business of scientific theorizing 
altogether (Kuhn (1970a), 79-82). By contrast, the immunity conferred to paradigms in normal sci-
ence provides a basis for the tenacious pursuit of theories which is in turn a necessary precondition 
for overcoming recalcitrant difficulties. 
However, when anomalies are mounting and the paradigm proves incapable of guiding a 
successful tradition of normal science, commitment to the fundamental principles is increasingly 
weakened and finally lost. In the course of such a “crisis” alternative theoretical options are consid-
ered and pursued. The emergence of a crisis follows from the principles of Kuhn’s account. As a 
result of the sophisticated and highly specialized work done in normal science, anomalies are bound 
to turn up (barring the extremely improbable eventuality that a theory gets everything right). As 
unsolved problems pile up, each tradition of normal science sooner or later grows into a crisis. Such 
a crisis frequently ends up with a “paradigm shift” that is characteristic of a “scientific revolution.” 
It is one of Kuhn’s central historical claims that a theory is never given up unless it can be replaced 
by an alternative approach. Abandoning a paradigm is tantamount to adopting a new one. In con-
trast to the smooth development of normal science, Kuhnian cataclysms amount to a wholesale sub-
stitution of the former conceptual framework. This means, in particular, that revolutions are non-
accumulative in that they involve taking back problem solutions that were formerly accepted as 
correct. What counted as trustworthy scientific knowledge before is at least drastically reinterpreted 
and frequently rejected as misleading or false.  
The non-accumulative character of scientific revolutions becomes manifest in four features, 
namely, in changes of the relevant concepts, of the problem-situations, of the criteria for evaluating 
theoretical achievements and, finally, in the occurrence of so-called “Kuhn-losses.” The assumed 
conceptual change constitutes the notorious doctrine of meaning variance which grows out of the 
assumption that meaning is determined by the pertinent theoretical context. Drastic alterations of 
this context lead to significant changes in the meaning of the concepts involved which in turn may 
vitiate the translatability of concepts from different theories. This result constitutes the “incommen-
surability thesis” which denies that the substantive claims of disparate theories can be translated into 
one another (Kuhn (1983)). I won’t go into this matter here. The reason is, first, that addressing 
this contentious issue deserves a full-scale treatise in itself, and that, second, it is of no relevance for 
the methodological problems I wish to discuss. The latter problems arise irrespective of any poten-
tial further aggravation generated through the breakdown of translation. Thus I proceed from the 
4assumption—as Lakatos does—that the substantive content and the empirical consequences of rival 
theoretical approaches can be compared.1
The second major shift occurring during a revolution concerns the change of problems. This 
is unsurprising at first sight. After all, it conforms well with the traditional picture of scientific pro-
gress that old problems are solved and new problems crop up. Kuhn does not deny that problem 
changes of this kind appear in the course of a revolution; on the contrary, the solution of long-
standing anomalies within the new framework constitutes one of the chief reasons for the shift of 
allegiance. However, as Kuhn stresses, an additional pattern of problem change turns up which 
amounts to “dissolving” a problem rather than solving it. That is, the legitimacy of the problem is 
rejected by the alternative approach (Kuhn (1970a), 103). For instance, around 1770 one the major 
challenges in chemistry was to explain the role of phlogiston in the release of hydrogen from the 
solution of metals in acids. The claim of the rival oxygen theory was that phlogiston doesn’t exist at 
all and that it consequently plays no role whatsoever in these processes. Accordingly, the question 
wasn’t answered; it was rejected as misguided instead. 
The third important alteration refers to the criteria invoked for judging problem solutions. 
Such criteria are frequently tied up with and specific for a given paradigm and thus change with a 
paradigm substitution. One of Kuhn’s examples is again taken from the Chemical Revolution. 
Within the phlogistic framework, it was considered the chief task of chemical theories to account 
for the properties of chemical substances (such as hardness, combustibilty, volatility and the like) 
along with their changes during chemical reactions. Consequently, chemical explanations are to be 
judged according to their capacity to afford such an account. In the course of the switch to the 
oxygen theory, these problems were shifted into the background whereas the challenge to accom-
modate reaction weights was moved to center stage. Chemical theories are to be assessed according 
as they meet this challenge. As a result of the paradigm shift, the standards for judging the adequacy 
of theoretical achievements are altered as well (Kuhn (1970a), 107; Kuhn (1977), 335-336).
Fourth, scientific revolutions frequently go along with what is now called Kuhn-losses. A 
new paradigm may be accepted in spite of the fact that some of the former explanatory achieve-
ments are thereby lost. More specifically, some of the phenomena accounted for previously are re-
transformed into open problems. Already explained data become anomalous again. To be sure, 
Kuhn-losses are only tolerated if they don’t exceed a low-level threshold. But the salient point is 
that they do occur and that their mere existence vitiates any claim to the effect that the new para-
1 The comparability of the empirical consequences of different paradigms is admitted by Kuhn also; 
see e.g. Kuhn (1970a), 97, 150; Kuhn (1977), 339. 
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of a Kuhn loss again refers to the Chemical Revolution. In the phlogistic framework a metal was 
regarded as a compound of a specific component (the “calx”) and phlogiston. Since phlogiston was 
assumed to be present in all metals, the theory could explain why they resembled one another to a 
much greater extent than the corresponding calces (the oxides in modern terminology). The oxygen 
theory, by contrast, considered metals elementary and thus lacked any resources to account for their 
similarity. The adoption of phlogiston theory thus reopened an empirical problem that was consid-
ered settled before (Kuhn (1977), 323; Kuhn (1970a), 132, 157, 170; Kuhn (1970b), 20). 
On the whole, then, and due to these four features, revolutions are characterized by a fun-
damental theory change which admits of no reconstruction to the effect that the earlier theory is 
approximately retained by the later. The contrast between theories separated by a revolution are far-
reaching and unbridgeable (Kuhn (1970a), 5-6, 97-110). 
2. Kuhn’s Account of Theory Choice Decisions 
Within the framework of the paradigm theory, theory choice decisions are only made in the course 
of revolutions. Naturally enough, Kuhn’s account of such decisions focuses on such cataclysmic 
periods. The central claim is that the best choice is not fixed by appeal to the available facts and to 
standards of evaluation traditionally deemed “rational.” Rather, there is room left for subjective 
factors, and their supplementary influence is not detrimental to scientific progress but constitutes a 
methodological virtue. 
The first contention is that the evaluation of theories cannot be made by relying only on the 
data. This claim follows directly from the basics of Kuhn’s paradigm theory. On the one hand, the 
old paradigm is afflicted with a particularly large number of anomalies; otherwise a crisis wouldn’t 
have occurred in the first place. On the other, the new paradigm, as a result of its nascent state, has 
not yet reached a level of elaboration and articulation comparable with the former monopolist. A 
freshly invented approach inevitably suffers from gaps and lacunae, most of which are unlikely to 
appear in the older competitor. The conclusion is that both rival approaches are anomaly-ridden so 
that the evidential situation fails to give unique preference to one of them. Empirical adequacy can-
not be the sole criterion for theory choice.  
Second, this shaky empirical ground necessitates the invocation of additional, non-empirical 
standards. However, the catch is that these standards depend on and vary with the paradigm candi-
dates at issue. As mentioned above, the contenders typically bring different standards for judging 
the appropriateness of problem solutions in their train. As a result of these disparate criteria, each 
competitor appreciates its own assets and its rival’s liabilities drawing on its own specific measures 
6of adequacy. Naturally enough, the adherents of the contrasting paradigms will fail to convince one 
another (Kuhn (1970a), 109-110). 
Third, not all criteria of appraisal are tied up with one of the rival candidates. There are 
shared methodological values, among which are explanatory power, precision, consistency or sim-
plicity. The problem is, though, that these standards are imprecise and can be made precise in dispa-
rate ways. If the simplicity of a given theory is to be assessed, different results are likely to turn up. 
Moreover, the application of more than one of these standards to a specific case may easily engen-
der conflicts among them. One of the candidates may have a wider scope while the other may fur-
nish more precise explanations within its more restricted domain. Due to the necessity of making 
precise and weighting standards of evaluation, even transparadigmatic agreement on such standards 
in no way guarantees the unanimous appraisal of particular theories. 
This contention can be condensed into what I call Kuhn’s “uncertainty thesis”: If the meth-
odological judgment of theories is based exclusively on a consideration of the facts and the applica-
tion of a canon of overarching, epistemically justified methodological rules, no clear comparative 
evaluation will emerge. To be sure, clear judgments could be made relying on theory-specific crite-
ria; but owing to their linkage with one of the competitors they fail to carry much force. This re-
stricted bearing of objective, overarching standards of evaluation makes room for the possible intru-
sion of subjective factors. Theory appraisal is a delicate affair in which a multitude of objective and 
subjective elements are intertwined in ways that may well differ among different scientists. And 
none of them could sensibly be blamed for violating the canon of rationality (Kuhn (1970a), 151-
153).  
In Kuhn’s opinion the room left for subjective factors in no way threatens the rationality of 
theory judgment. To be sure, freeplay of this sort is in conflict with a model of scientific rationality 
which regards theory evaluation as a quasi-algorithmic procedure of applying strict methodological 
rules. But such a view flies in the face of the real uncertainties involved in any such appraisal. There 
can be no reliable methodological measure of future achievements of a theory. No methodology is 
possibly able to tell how well a theory will be able to cope with future challenges; after all, some of 
the relevant problems may not even be known at the time in question. Methodological standards 
suitable to unambiguously give preference to one of the competing approaches would lead to the 
latter’s unanimous adoption and pursuit. Given the real uncertainties of the situation, any methodo-
logical selection of this kind involves a high risk of being wrong. But as a result of the general ac-
ceptance of one of the candidates, no alternative is available anymore. Consequently, a possibly 
mistaken theory choice couldn’t be corrected. The approach singled out earlier has become the only 
7game in town. By contrast, the rational way of dealing with the risks involved in theory choice is to 
pursue the entire spectrum of options. In a crisis, theoretical pluralism is the order of the day. This 
can be achieved by splitting up the relevant scientific community. Some scientists follow one theo-
retical route, and some trace the consequences of another. And the most natural way to split up a 
community is to appeal to subjective factors (such as aesthetic considerations) which, as a rule, vary 
strongly among its members. Methodological uncertainty thus leads to a division of theoretical la-
bor which constitutes the most appropriate way of coping with the risks involved in theory choice 
decisions. In sum, Kuhn’s claim is that methodological uncertainty of the kind specified in no way 
vitiates scientific rationality but rather brings out more clearly its core and kernel (Kuhn (1977), 
325-332). 
However, this account raises a problem for Kuhn’s account of scientific development. Kuhn 
gives an epistemological argument in favor of paradigm monopoly and the subsequent emergence of 
a crisis. Therefore, one should also expect an epistemological argument for the eventual completion 
(or abortion, as the case may be) of a scientific revolution. It should follow from Kuhn’s principles 
that a crisis grows into a new tradition of normal science. But in light of his epistemological defense 
of methodological uncertainty quite the reverse is true. Given the virtue of theoretical pluralism 
implied by Kuhn’s argument, one anticipates that a crisis should endure indefinitely and that mono-
lithic dominance of a paradigm is never reestablished. Normal science is unstable but crises aren’t. 
The completion of a revolution and the corresponding onset of a new tradition of normal science 
thus remains puzzling within Kuhn’s framework. There are two options for dealing with this his-
torical anomaly. One could either deny that theoretical pluralism is confined to crisis situations and 
disappears after these specific periods, or one could claim that the methodological uncertainties are 
less marked than Kuhn would have it. In the latter case, all parties would eventually place their bets 
on a common candidate. Both options, however, would seriously undermine the fundamentals of 
the paradigm theory. Actually, they form part of Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research pro-
grams (see below sec. 5). 
Let me summarize the most important historical claims entertained by Kuhn. Periods of 
normal science or theoretical monism are followed by revolutions or periods of theoretical plural-
ism. In normal science the theoretical principles are retained entirely; no significant theoretical inno-
vation is found. Theory choice decisions are only made during revolutionary periods, and these de-
cisions are not fixed by the available data along with transparadigmatic methodological standards. 
This means that there is no way of objectively singling out the most qualified paradigm candidate. 
Furthermore, a revolution always involves the substitution, and never the mere abandonment, of a 
8paradigm. And the new paradigm cannot be reconstructed as containing the claims of its predeces-
sor “in the limit”; revolutions proceed in a thoroughly non-accumulative fashion. 
3. Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programs  
Lakatos is chiefly concerned with the methodological explanation of theory choice decisions. In 
particular, he accepts some of the historical generalizations advanced by Kuhn and takes them as a 
sort of evidential basis of methodology. I wish to clarify the nature and import of Lakatos’ en-
deavor. This involves a pinch of “rational reconstruction” of his approach, that is, some sort of im-
provement (as I hope) where the real wording is given in the footnotes.2 I begin by sketching Laka-
tos’ criteria for evaluating theories or research programs and subsequently bring them to bear on 
the explanation of the growth of knowledge. 
Lakatos presupposes the viability of the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis. Roughly speaking, it 
says that experience alone is insufficient for conclusive confirmation or refutation of any given piece
of a theoretical network. First, conclusive empirical confirmation is beyond the reach of hy-
pothetico-deductive testing because mistaken principles may entail truthful empirical consequences. 
It follows that true observational results do not license inference to the truth of the principles from 
which they were derived. Second, conclusive empirical refutation is vitiated by the fact that it is not 
a single theoretical assumption but always a complex network of theoretical hypotheses that gives 
rise to observational consequences in the first place. As a result, an anomaly can never be attributed 
to a specific axiom. To a significant extent it is up to the scientists to distribute praise and blame for 
empirical success or failure among the system of theoretical principles at issue (Lakatos (1970), 97-
98; Lakatos (1971), 111). 
If theoretical assumptions cannot be judged relying on the facts alone, the only alternative 
that conforms to the received notion of rationality is to draw in addition on objective, epistemically 
relevant standards. On that notion, rationality is essentially characterized by guidance through gen-
eral and justified rules. However, Kuhn’s uncertainty thesis for methodological evaluation blocks 
this auxiliary procedure. It is this result that constitutes the major threat to scientific rationality as it 
emerges from Kuhn’s approach. Lakatos’ intention is to demonstrate that this threat can be coun-
tered. His approach can be reconstructed to the effect that Kuhn’s uncertainty thesis does not cap-
ture the essentials of theory choice but rather arises from Kuhn’s failure to consider appropriate 
standards of theory evaluation. 
2 This is analogous to Lakatos’ recommendation for reconstructing the history of scicence; Lakatos 
(1971), 120. 
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an ongoing competition among research programs. The anatomy of a research program is charac-
terized by two elements, namely, its “hard core” and its “positive heuristic.” The hard core contains 
the fundamental postulates of the program; they are retained during the program’s lifetime. The 
positive heuristic spells out guidelines for its future theoretical development. It singles out signifi-
cant problems and sketches pathways to their solution. Thus, it directs scientists through the maze 
of confusing difficulties by giving them an idea where to drive at. The positive heuristic draws a 
picture of the program’s “better self.” One of Lakatos’ historical assertions is that the development 
of a qualified program is determined by its heuristic. It is a hallmark of superiority that a program 
proceeds autonomously and does not merely respond to conceptual and empirical difficulties (Laka-
tos (1970), 47-52, 68-69). 
The hard-core postulates are irrefutable within the pertinent program. Abandoning them is 
tantamount to giving up the program. However, their irrefutability has nothing to do with the sub-
stance of the claims involved; it rather arises from the firm commitment of the program adherents 
not to admit their refutation. Instead, anomalies are accommodated by adapting the “protective 
belt” of auxiliary hypotheses. According to the empirical needs, this protective belt is expanded, 
modified, restructured or replaced entirely. It follows from the Duhem-Quine thesis that an empiri-
cal problem never bears directly on a specific theoretical hypothesis. Thus, there is always room left 
for the scientists to shield their pet principles from the refuting impact of anomalies and to redirect 
the latter’s force to assumptions from the protective belt. The belt thus constitutes a sort of buffer 
zone in which the required adaptations are made (Lakatos (1970), 48-50).   
Modifications within the protective belt may concern, first, observation theories, second, ini-
tial and boundary conditions, and, third, additional assumptions within the respective theory itself. 
Take the program of Newtonian celestial mechanics as an example. Its hard core is given by New-
ton’s laws of motion and the law of gravitation. These laws are intended to be kept intact come 
what may. Suppose the astronomical data regarding planetary positions don’t match the theoretical 
expectations. Instead of regarding this finding as a falsification of the theory, one might pick one of 
three responses to follow. A modification of the relevant observation theories consisted, e.g., in 
tampering with the laws of optics upon which the inference from a spot observed in a telescope to 
the planet’s position relies. An adaptation of assumptions concerning the relevant initial and bound-
ary conditions could be made by postulating a hitherto unknown planet and by attributing the 
anomalous behavior of the observed planet to the unrecognized influence of this additional celestial 
body. An auxiliary adjustment of the theory itself could involve the introduction of a non-uniform 
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mass distribution of the sun which would lead to a predicted deviation from the inverse-square drop 
of intensity. In this case the original law is not abandoned; rather, a supplementary gravitational 
effect is invoked in addition. 
The hard core and the positive heuristic characterize a program in its entirety; they consti-
tute its criteria of identity. A specific version of a program is given by these invariant elements to-
gether with the changing protective belt. All three ingredients make up a program version. The de-
velopment of a research program can be represented as a chain of subsequent versions each of 
which arises from its predecessor by some theoretical modification, usually performed in the protec-
tive belt. It is obvious that some sort of grading of such modifications is needed; if each were sup-
posed to be as good as any other, the coherence of a research program would soon be lost. How-
ever, it appears from the above-given description that Lakatos doesn’t place much faith in the con-
straining force of facts. In order to distinguish between acceptable and inappropriate theoretical 
changes, constraints of a different nature are called for. Lakatos appeals to methodological stan-
dards instead. Such standards primarily express conditions for a justified transition from a program 
version to its successor. They stipulate which theoretical changes within a program are methodol-
ogically sound: A program version which complies with these standards counts as superior to its 
predecessor. I confine myself to giving and elaborating Lakatos’ criteria in their original form. 
Shortly before his death in 1974, Lakatos started to attenuate his standards, and in the years to fol-
low a large number of other suggestions cropped up within the Lakatosian school. I can’t address 
all these distinctions and ramifications and so I’ll stick to the original.3
Lakatos requires that a theoretical alteration within a research program is justified if the fol-
lowing four conditions are satisfied: 
(1) The modification conforms to the positive heuristic of the program. 
(2) The follow-up version is able to account for all those phenomena that are successfully explained 
by its predecessor.4 This is not to say that all corroborated derivations are to be reproduced by the 
successor. Rather, the relevant phenomena may be accounted for in different ways. 
3 For a brief overview of post-Lakatos elaborations of the crucial notion of “novel facts” see Carrier 
(1988). See also Musgrave (1974). 
4 Rendering the preservation condition this way involves what I take as a charitable reading of 
Lakatos. Lakatos misleadingly or inappropriately demanded that the successor version reproduce 
the entire “unrefuted content” of its predecessor (Lakatos (1970), 32, 33) — that is, including the 
claims that were never tested empirically. But this is a strange demand. Why should a theory be 
forced to account for claims that may quite well be mistaken? Moreover, the demand to retain a 
theory’s unrefuted content is at odds with Lakatos’ own paraphrase of this very condition, 
namely, to explain its “previous success” (Lakatos (1970), 32, 68). Untested allegations can 
hardly be grouped among the cases of previous success. The formulation adopted here is intended 
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(3) The successor “predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact” (Lakatos (1970), 33). Such 
“novel facts” are empirical generalizations that were not to be expected on the basis of “previous 
knowledge” (Lakatos (1970), 34). That is, Lakatos demands the prediction of observational regu-
larities that were unknown to science before.5
(4) The predicted effects are found empirically. 
If the first three conditions are satisfied the program is “theoretically progressive”; if the fourth de-
mand is met in addition, the program is “empirically progressive.” Lakatos’ condition of progress 
requires that all justified transitions within a program be at least theoretically progressive and that 
empirically progressive shifts be accomplished “occasionally.” If a program version keeps up with 
the explanatory achievements of its predecessor and brings forth new successful predictions, it pos-
sesses “corroborated excess content,” and it is this kind of surplus performance that is the most 
significant justification of its acceptance. The empirical confirmation of theoretical anticipations is 
the stuff of which methodological superiority and scientific progress is made (Lakatos (1970), 31-
34; Lakatos (1971), 112).  
Rival research programs can be evaluated analogously. The condition of progress within a 
program is transferred with minor variations to the comparative judgment of entire programs. The 
first relevant question is whether the two competing programs are progressive from the respective 
program-internal point of view. If one is progressive and the other isn’t (i.e., it is “degenerating”), 
the first is superior to the latter. Second, the conditions (2) to (4) are brought to bear on the rival 
program. These conditions require to cope with all known phenomena and to anticipate new ones. 
In judging entire programs, the relevant standard of comparison is not the earlier version of the 
same program but the most recent version of the alternative program. It is demanded to predict 
empirical regularities that were not known before and are thus, in particular, novel with respect to 
to capture the intuition to preserve a theory’s successful applications. It amounts to replacing 
“unrefuted content” by “corroborated content.” See also Rott (1994), 33-36.  
5 I adopt a temporal reading of “novel fact”: A fact is novel if its theoretical derivation precedes its 
empirical detection. A lot of passages in Lakatos support this reading; in addition to the ones 
given see e.g. Lakatos (1970), 36 (which involves contrasting predicted facts with solved anoma-
lies), Lakatos (1971), 114-116 (which stresses the significance of the temporal relations between 
theoretical derivation and empirical detection). On the other hand, Lakatos also gives a compara-
tive interpretation of novelty. Facts count as novel that are “improbable in the light of, or even 
forbidden by,” a rival theory (Lakatos (1970), 32). On that view, a theory’s explanation of a ri-
val’s known anomaly would qualify as novel fact, although it is “old” in the sense of being famil-
iar to science. To make matters worse, Lakatos also advances an interpretative reading of nov-
elty. As he says, an alternative explanation of a known fact should in the early stages of theory 
development also be accepted as novel (Lakatos (1970), 69-70). That is, the mere reinterpretation 
of a known and explained phenomenon makes a program progressive. The comparative and the 
interpretative reading involve an attenuation of the temporal one. I adopt the strongest, i.e., tem-
poral, version since it is the only one that actually provides all the methodological explanations I 
attribute to Lakatos in sec. 4. 
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the competing program. Evaluating two progressive programs thus involves comparing the respec-
tive explanatory achievements in light of the methodological criteria given.6
It is worth repeating that the demand to reproduce the explanatory achievements of another 
theory (preceding version or alternative program) does not amount to the requirement to reproduce 
the explanations themselves. Retention of the principles and the modes of derivation is not neces-
sary; the relevant phenomena may well be accommodated in a disparate fashion. It is thus permitted 
that a modification involves a fundamental change in the theoretical treatment. For this reason 
Lakatos’ condition of progress is compatible with non-accumulative change in the Kuhnian sense of 
a complete replacement, rather than approximate retention, of a theory by another one.7
4. The Rationality of Theory Choice Decisions  
It leaps to the eye that some of Lakatos’ concepts are modeled on Kuhnian notions. A research 
program roughly corresponds to a paradigm, and a program change approximately resembles a sci-
entific revolution. The retention of the hard core and the positive heuristic in pursuing a program 
reproduces the continuity of normal science. Finally, the methodological license to give up accepted 
explanations and to accommodate the relevant phenomena in a distinct fashion captures the non-
accumulative character of revolutions.   
However, Lakatos’ methodology in no way simply mimics Kuhn’s notions in a different 
conceptual framework. It rather aims at solving methodological problems raised by the paradigm 
theory. The first relevant claim concerns the rejection of Kuhn’s uncertainty thesis. This alleged 
uncertainty arises from Kuhn’s approach to ground methodological judgment on a collection of 
alternative criteria. Lakatos replaces Kuhn’s heterogeneous collection by a small number of clear 
requirements, namely, to reproduce explanatory content and to anticipate novel regularities. More-
over, conflicts between the demands cannot arise because satisfaction of all of them is required. A 
superior theory is in need of reproduction and anticipation. The Kuhnian process of considering and 
6 It is true, Lakatos’ remarks on program replacement are brief and obscure (Lakatos (1970), 69; 
Lakatos & Zahar (1976), 179), and he never specifies the details of comparative program evalua-
tion. It is clear, however, that his evaluation procedure involves a transfer of the criteria for pro-
gress within a program to the comparative appraisal of entire programs. The reconstruction given 
here represents what I take to be the most direct or most immediate such transfer. With the ex-
ception of the positive heuristic that is specific for a program and thus cannot directly be applied 
to program comparison, it brings to bear all the hallmarks of a progressive program so as to iden-
tify a superior program. 
7 As indicated above with respect to paradigms (see note 1), the feasibility of this procedure re-
quires that the empirical achievements of distinct research programs can indeed be compared. 
This is tantamount to rejecting a strong version of incommensurability according to which the oc-
currence of meaning variance excludes such a comparison. It is now generally agreed that the lat-
ter claim involves an exaggeration and is unfounded (see for instance Laudan (1977), 143-144). 
Conversely, Lakatos’ condition for inter-program comparison can be put into practice. 
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weighting alternative standards is dropped. Lakatos’ procedure of methodological comparison thus 
removes the uncertainties characteristic of Kuhn’s approach. 
This procedure can be spelled out as follows. The relevant difficulty, as pointed out by 
Kuhn, is that each theory at the same time agrees and conflicts with a large number of facts so that 
the empirical situation is confusing. Namely, any theory which is at all seriously discussed in a sci-
entific community is buttressed by some successful explanations. On the other hand, Kuhn’s thesis 
of the omnipresence of anomalies entails that any theory is also liable to a number of unsolved prob-
lems. Judging or comparing the empirical adequacy of rival theories is thus a highly intricate matter 
where an unanimous outcome cannot be expected. 
Lakatos’ way out of this difficulty amounts to granting only a small number of phenomena 
any relevance for the methodological assessment of a theory. Most of the facts a theory agrees with 
and most of its anomalies don’t bear on the theory’s qualification. Rather, the evaluation of a theory 
is essentially based on the few cases of corroborated excess content, i.e., on the confirmed novel 
predictions. Lakatos’ methodological criteria specify demands for those facts a theory can rightly 
count in its favor. These criteria operate by singling out “supporting facts,” that is, facts explained 
in a particularly qualified manner. The appraisal of a theory is to be based exclusively on these facts. 
A theory is only confirmed by its supporting facts, not by all of its correct empirical consequences. 
If consideration is restricted to a selected group of outstanding explanations, it is much easier to 
reach an agreement on how well the theory is doing empirically. “Qualified empirical adequacy” of 
a theory is based on facts singled out as important by the methodology, and this guidance facilitates 
the comparison of empirical performance tremendously (Lakatos (1970), 36; Lakatos (1971), 112). 
Kuhn’s theory-specific criteria that depend on and vary with the respective paradigm be-
come part of the positive heuristic in Lakatos. The positive heuristic determines which kinds of 
theoretical means and procedures are acceptable within a program or which theoretical aims are to 
be followed. The positive heuristic plays the same role in a program as does Kuhn’s set of theory-
specific standards in a paradigm. However, in contrast to Kuhn, these standards are denied any in-
fluence on the comparative evaluation of programs. After all, compliance with the positive heuristic 
is only required within a program, and the judgment of entire programs relies exclusively on over-
arching, theory-neutral—or “transparadigmatic”—criteria.8
8 To state the matter somewhat more carefully, all what Lakatos really says is to deny theory-
specific criteria such as Kuhn’s any right to rule on the acceptability of explanations (Lakatos 
(1970), 68). However, precisely because such criteria are intimately tied up with the conceptual 
essentials of the respective paradigm (or research program, for that matter) they are apt to guide 
its future development. Kuhn’s criteria determine what an exemplary explanation is supposed to 
14
Whether or not Lakatos’ conception is actually able to overcome the uncertainties indicated 
by Kuhn is a matter of empirical scrutiny. It can only be shown by studies in the history of science if 
Lakatos’ criteria of theory evaluation are actually suitable for determining theory choice uniquely, 
for one, and for singling out theories deemed superior with hindsight, for another. However, there 
is a second strand in Lakatos’ approach that addresses more general tenets of the paradigm theory. 
It is the overarching characteristics of theory change, as advanced by Kuhn, that are at Lakatos’ 
focus. Lakatos’ conception allows for a methodological derivation of some of Kuhn’s descriptional 
generalizations about theory change. The first relevant finding is the immunity of paradigms to 
anomalies. Its analog for research programs can be derived as follows. Supporting facts are consti-
tuted by correctly predicted empirical regularities. Such facts have not been accounted for by the 
competing program; they would otherwise not be “novel.” Thus, Lakatos’ condition of progress 
implies that only those facts are suitable for buttressing a program which cannot be explained by its 
rival.9 Conversely, only those facts speak against a program that favor its competitor. It follows that 
only those anomalies count as failure which can be solved by the rival in a qualified fashion (i.e., by 
predicting unknown phenomena at the same time). There is no refutation without confirmation 
(Lakatos (1970), 37). This entails that the mere inability to accommodate this or that observational 
regularity does not bring a program into difficulty (Lakatos (1970), 92). And this conclusion pre-
cisely coincides with the Kuhnian immunity claim which is thereby derived from Lakatos’ notion of 
supporting facts. Research programs are rightly immune to “mere anomalies.” If a research program 
is to be criticized effectively it is not sufficient to expound its liabilities. Rather, what hurts a pro-
gram is the qualified solution to its problems within a different theoretical perspective. 
Another historical regularity stressed by Kuhn is that paradigms are never given up unless an 
appropriate alternative is available. Scientific revolutions always involve theory-substitutions. Its 
Lakatosian analog is: No program abandonment without program replacement. A program is only 
disqualified methodologically if a superior competitor is at hand. This condition can be derived from 
a corollary to the immunity argument. This argument says that the liabilities of one theory are the 
assets of the other. There are no significant failures without an alternative solution. And obviously 
enough, if a theory is not in trouble it should not be given up. It follows that a program can never 
accomplish in a theoretical tradition, and this is also part of the task Lakatos assigns to his posi-
tive heuristic. Thus, the latter provides the proper home for these criteria. 
9 It is true, this does not follow rigorously. It might happen that the prediction of one program is 
accommodated without any conceptual adaptation by another program. In cases of this kind a fact 
supporting one program is not anomalous for its rival. Atlhough historical examples for this pat-
tern can be given, it is still a somewhat remote eventuality. In the vast majority of cases one’s 
theory’s support is another theory’s pitfall. 
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be rated as deficient unless there is a contender attacking it with some success. Disqualification of a 
program is brought about by a corroborated rival (Lakatos (1970), 35; Lakatos (1971), 112-113).10
Kuhn’s claims as to paradigm immunity and paradigm substitution are leveled as descrip-
tional objections to methodological requirements entertained by Popper. They are advanced as his-
torical counterexamples to Popper’s demands. It is true, a historical description cannot refute a 
methodological norm. But Popper and Kuhn share the commitment that historical theory change, at 
least concerning its fundamental and long-term aspects, is rationally justified and constitutes growth 
of knowledge. In light of this commitment historical arguments cannot be dismissed offhand. Within 
the framework of Lakatos’ methodology, by contrast, the two features of immunity and substitution 
constitute theorems rather than objections. They follow from Lakatos’ conception of how theories 
are to be evaluated. The important result is that if theory change occurs the way Kuhn says, it does 
not do violence to methodological rules but rather conforms to such rules. Lakatos’ conception is 
thus able to provide a methodological explanation of these Kuhnian characteristics of scientific 
change.  
Lakatos’ conception also manages to solve a long-standing problem of theory evaluation. 
Since the days of Pierre Duhem it has been stressed repeatedly that the application of tough meth-
odological criteria to nascent theories would defeat them prematurely and thus tends to thwart sci-
entific progress. A freshly invented theory needs room to grow before it is subjected to the full 
force of demanding standards. The traditional solution to this problem is to require temporary sus-
pension of methodological judgment. For instance, Duhem argues that only full-fledged theories 
should be blamed for empirical difficulties in their domain (Duhem (1906), 10.§7). That is, the con-
dition of empirical adequacy is weakened during the early stages of a theory’s development. 
As Kuhn stresses, no such explicit suspension is requisite within his approach. Since even 
the application of shared methodological standards is subject to an individually varying process of 
making them precise and weighting them, it is to be expected that promising, newly conceived theo-
ries come out as qualified on at least some such application. So it is not necessary to resort to any 
specific rule to weaken the full force of methodology in a theory’s early stages (Kuhn (1977), 331-
332). 
Lakatos’ approach likewise entails such an initial restriction of methodological evaluation 
automatically and without any specific rule to this effect. But the mechanism by which this restric-
10 This important feature of Lakatos’ methodology has completely escaped Kuhn’s notice. Kuhn 
objects to Lakatos that for him, just as for Popper, “the existence of a potential replacement the-
ory appears pure coincidence” (Kuhn (1980), 191). This criticism is certainly unjustified. 
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tion is achieved is quite different from Kuhn’s. In Lakatos, the postponement of judgment immedi-
ately follows from the notion of supporting facts. First, mere anomalies are not troublesome for a 
program. Consequently, fresh programs are not liable to the suffocating grip of having to cope with 
each possibly relevant phenomenon. In this vein, Lakatos derives from his methodology that bud-
ding programs are to be treated leniently (Lakatos (1970), 92; see also ibid. 70). Second, empirical 
support arises from confirmed predictions. But in order to assess if a prediction is successful a pe-
riod of time is necessary. As a rule, experimental work is requisite to examine the correctness of a 
theory’s anticipation, and experiments usually take their time. As a consequence of Lakatos’ notion 
of what kind of evidence backs a theory, the performance of a theory cannot be assessed instantly. 
A program cannot be judged by drawing only on the evidence available at the time of its inception. 
This delay in judgment Lakatos calls “the end of instant rationality” (Lakatos (1970), 68, 87). Its 
salient aspect is that it entails an initial suspension of judgment and thus spares one the need of pos-
tulating it separately. An isolated methodological rule thus becomes a methodological theorem. 
On the other hand, this built-in delay considerably limits the possible scope of Lakatos’ 
methodology. It follows, namely, that the methodology is of virtually no avail for the working sci-
entist. Empirical progressiveness can only be identified in retrospect which means that Lakatos’ 
criteria are not overly helpful in the actual process of theory choice: They typically fail to establish 
an unambiguous ranking of the rival approaches.11 Theories can only be judged when the relevant 
evidence is finally in, and this means, they can only be judged with hindsight.  
However, this restriction does not vitiate the viability of Lakatos’ methodology for two rea-
sons. First, as pointed out by Kuhn, the uncertainty of methodological evaluation is not detrimental 
to scientific progress but rather promotes it. The division of theoretical labor is the most fruitful 
strategy to cope with the objective risks involved in theory choice decisions, and this division is 
achieved most easily if distinct criteria of evaluation are brought to bear (see above sec. 2). But this 
strategy can only be pursued if none of the rivals comes out clearly superior. And precisely this 
room for consideration is supplied by the delayed applicability of Lakatos’ criteria. This means that 
Lakatos rejects Kuhn’s uncertainty thesis in letter but retains it in spirit. Second, one of Lakatos’ 
chief aims is to defend the rationality or the rule-guided nature of theory choice decisions. For the 
success of this endeavor it is immaterial which is the right perspective for reconstructing such deci-
sions as directed by objective, epistemically relevant criteria. What counts is that such a perspective 
11 In addition, Lakatos does not regard an eventual rank-order as recommendation to the scientists 
to pursue the best-rated theory to the exclusion of the rest (Lakatos (1970), 71-72; Lakatos 
(1971), 117). I leave this further restriction out of consideration. 
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exits. It need not be identical to the point of view of the working scientist; it may also be the retro-
spective position of the historian of science (Hacking (1979), 387-388). On the whole, then, Laka-
tos’ claim is that theory evaluations can be reconstructed as rule-guided and hence rational without 
at the same time running into Kuhn’s difficulty of premature decisions. Once in a while it is possible 
to have the cake and eat it, too. 
5. Comparing Methodological Research Programs: Kuhn versus Lakatos 
Given the historical bearing of methodologies, their performance is subject to quasi-empirical scru-
tiny.12 Lakatos’ conception entails consequences as to rational theory choice decisions. Decisions of 
the scientific community about particular theoretical alterations or achievements (that is, Lakatos’ 
“basic value judgments”) constitute the evidential basis of methodological theories (Lakatos (1971), 
123-124,132-134). This opens up an avenue for reconstructing the approaches of Kuhn and Laka-
tos as methodological research programs and applying Lakatos’ criteria to their evaluation. 
In order for a program to outperform its rival it is necessary to reproduce the rival’s con-
firmed explanatory content. Lakatos’ conception is able to accommodate the following features of 
scientific change as brought forward by the paradigm theory: First, the non-accumulative character 
of scientific change, second, paradigm immunity, third, paradigm substitution, and, fourth, the room 
left for theory choice decisions, i.e, the initial suspension of judgment (see above sec. 4). The fur-
ther major demand for program replacement is the requirement of producing “novel predictions” or 
corroborated excess content. This is achieved with respect to two features of scientific change. 
First, Lakatos’ methodology entails that science is characterized by a thorough theoretical pluralism 
rather than the Kuhnian monopolistic rule of paradigms punctuated by occasional cataclysmic erup-
tions. Judging from the historical record, Lakatos’ picture captures scientific change more accu-
rately than Kuhn’s. In particular, Lakatos’ commitment to theoretical pluralism is apt to solve the 
historical anomaly of the paradigm theory that in view of Kuhn’s epistemological arguments in fa-
vor of pluralism, the return to paradigm monopoly is puzzling (see above sec. 2). Judging by Laka-
tos’ lights, no such return to theoretical monism should occur.  
Second, Lakatos’ demand that the empirical achievements of an abandoned program be re-
produced by its successor (if in a theoretically disparate fashion) also matches the historical record 
better than Kuhn’s view of unbridgeable gaps between successive paradigms. For instance, one of 
the objections to Kuhn’s view is that the very first laws enunciated in modern science, namely, 
Snell’s law of refraction and Galileo’s law of free fall, still form part of latter-day textbooks. To all 
12 See Laudan et al. (1986) for a collection of the relevant historical claims. 
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appearances, theoretical accomplishments are retained to a far greater extent than Kuhn would have 
it. So far, then, Lakatos’ methodological research program comes out superior with respect to 
Kuhn’s. On the other hand, there are clear historical violations of Lakatos’ demand to reproduce 
completely the explanatory achievements of replaced programs. These violations become manifest 
in the existence of Kuhn losses (see above sec. 2). Program substitutions in spite of Kuhn losses are 
incompatible with Lakatos’ standards. But they do in fact occur. 
Moreover, in contrast to Lakatos’ picture of a linear chain of subsequent program versions, 
several conflicting versions of the same program frequently co-occur in historical reality. Accord-
ingly, programs resemble clusters rather than linear chains (Laudan (1977), 78, 97-100; Gholson & 
Barker (1985), 762-763). However, the latter empirical problem likewise turns up in the paradigm 
theory; Kuhn’s normal science is characterized by theoretical unanimity also. Barring crises, no 
multiplicity of theoretical approaches occurs. 
This means that it is only the existence of Kuhn losses which prevents Lakatos’ methodol-
ogy from superseding the paradigm theory as an account of scientific change by its own methodo-
logical lights. Actually, the problem of Kuhn losses was faced within Lakatosianism. The attempt 
was made to adapt Lakatos’ standards of theory evaluation so as to allow for a clear methodologi-
cal comparison even in their presence (Worrall (1978), 63-64). However, these adaptations are also 
influential on the achievements of Lakatos’ methodology for explaining features of theory change. 
These repercussions make it impossible to trace their consequences here. 
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